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Exactly What They Asked For: Linking 
Harm and Intent in Wire Fraud 
Prosecutions 
CHRISTINA M. FROHOCK & MARCOS DANIEL JIMÉNEZ* 
Recent opinions have obscured the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit’s guidance on federal criminal fraud 
prosecutions. In 2016, the court decided United States v. Ta-
khalov and found no crime of wire fraud where the alleged 
victims received the benefit of their bargain. Just three years 
later, the concurring opinion in United States v. Feldman 
criticized that prior reasoning as puzzling, inviting problem-
atic interpretations that become untethered from the com-
mon law of fraud. This Article tracks the development of the 
court’s view and argues for an interpretation of Takhalov 
that links harm to the specific intent necessary for a federal 
criminal fraud charge. 
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 INTRODUCTION  
Should federal criminal fraud convictions stand when the alleged 
victims received what they bargained for? The U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit has struggled to answer that question. In 
2016, the court ruled in United States v. Takhalov that there can be 
no federal wire fraud when the defendants “gave the victims exactly 
what they asked for and charged them exactly what they agreed to 
pay.”1 The Takhalov opinion followed common-law tradition in link-
ing fraud and harm, as the court analyzed the criminal fraud statute 
from the perspective of whether the purported victims received what 
they bargained for—even if they were deceived and would have 
avoided the bargain altogether without the deception.2 Wire fraud re-
quires a scheme to defraud, with intended harm rather than actual 
harm.3 The principle of “no harm, no foul” may govern in basketball4 
and common-law fraud, but transforms into “no intent, no foul” in 
federal criminal fraud.5 
Yet, only three years later, the concurring opinion in United 
States v. Feldman cast doubt on the Takhalov court’s reasoning.6  
Judge William Pryor expressed concern over the “puzzling opinion” 
that the benefit of the bargain negates wire fraud.7 The court’s 
 
 1 United States v. Takhalov, 827 F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 2016), modified, 
838 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir. 2016). 
 2 Id. at 1310, 1313; see id. at 1311 (“In the defendants’ story, none of these 
allegedly swindled men were truly victims: they knowingly entered the clubs, 
bought bottles of liquor, and drank them with their female companions. Thus, in 
the defendants’ view, these men got what they paid for—nothing more, nothing 
less.”); see also Harm, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining 
“harm” as “[i]njury, loss, damage; material or tangible detriment”). 
 3 Takhalov, 827 F.3d at 1310, 1313; see also JOHN WILLARD, A TREATISE 
ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 147 (Platt Potter ed., 1875) (“Fraud has been defined 
to be, any kind of artifice by which another is deceived.”). 
 4 Cf. CHARLES CLAY DOYLE ET AL., THE DICTIONARY OF MODERN 
PROVERBS 117 (2012) (tracing the origin of “no harm, no foul” to basketball ref-
ereeing, with the phrase first published in the Hartford Courant in 1956). 
 5 See United States v. Artuso, 482 F. App’x 398, 402 (11th Cir. 2012) (noting 
that wire fraud defendant “seems to present a ‘no harm/no foul’ argument that the 
government failed to prove [the company] was defrauded of any money or prop-
erty and, therefore, the evidence failed to support the convictions,” and that “[h]is 
argument misses the point of mail and wire fraud criminal charges”). 
 6 United States v. Feldman, 931 F.3d 1245, 1265, 1267 (11th Cir. 2019) (W. 
Pryor, J., concurring). 
 7 Id. at 1265. 
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opinion could be interpreted narrowly or broadly and could be based 
on harm or materiality.8 According to Judge Pryor, all options are 
problematic: the narrow interpretations are too narrow, and the broad 
interpretations risk abandoning the statute’s common-law heritage.9 
The Feldman concurrence may signal a retreat from the Eleventh 
Circuit’s view in Takhalov. Such a retreat would be unfortunate, as 
Takhalov advances our understanding of wire fraud prosecutions by 
tightening the link between harm and intent. This Article tracks the 
development of the court’s view and argues for an interpretation of 
Takhalov that looks from specific harm to specific intent: there can 
be no crime of wire fraud when the victims received exactly what 
they asked for consistent with the defendant’s intent. 
I. BENEFIT OF THE BARGAIN 
The federal statutes criminalizing mail fraud and wire fraud are 
powerful and flexible tools for prosecutors, covering a wide range of 
cases from traditional fraud to political corruption.10 In fiscal year 
2018, U.S. Attorneys’ Offices filed 4592 white-collar crime cases, 
the majority charging fraud.11 In his former role as a prosecutor, Sen-
ior Judge Jed S. Rakoff of the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York described mail fraud as “our Stradivarius, our 
Colt .45, our Louisville Slugger, our Cuisinart—and our true love.”12 
Spreading the love, courts apply the same analysis to both mail and 
wire fraud.13 
 
 8 Id. at 1267–68. 
 9 Id. at 1270. 
 10 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2018) (criminalizing mail fraud and wire 
fraud, respectively); Joseph Lanuti, Mail and Wire Fraud, 56 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1151, 1151–52 (2019); KELLY J. STRADER, UNDERSTANDING WHITE COLLAR 
CRIME 73 (4th ed. 2017). 
 11 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ ANNUAL 
STATISTICAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2018, at 12 (2018), https://www.jus-
tice.gov/usao/page/file/1199336/download. 
 12 Jed S. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part I), 18 DUQ. L. REV. 
771, 771 (1980); see also Stuart Taylor, Jr., Law’s ‘Stradivarius’; Inside Trader 
Ruling Saves Mail Law as Key Tool for Federal Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
19, 1987, at A20. 
 13 Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 25 n.6 (1987) (“The mail and wire 
fraud statutes share the same language in relevant part, and accordingly we apply 
the same analysis to both sets of offenses here.”); see also, e.g., United States v. 
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Wire fraud is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1343, which provides that 
[w]hoever, having devised or intending to devise any 
scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money 
or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
representations, or promises, transmits or causes to 
be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television 
communication in interstate or foreign commerce, 
any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for 
the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more 
than 20 years, or both.14 
The Eleventh Circuit generally articulates two elements: “(1) in-
tentional participation in a scheme to defraud, and, (2) the use of the 
interstate mails or wires in furtherance of that scheme.”15 Other cir-
cuit courts (and even, on occasion, the Eleventh Circuit) add a third, 
isolating specific intent to defraud or “money or property as the 
 
Ross, 131 F.3d 970, 985 (11th Cir. 1997) (applying mail fraud analysis to defend-
ants’ convictions under wire fraud statute); United States v. Manarite, 44 F.3d 
1407, 1411 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that “wire fraud statute is read in light of 
the case law on mail fraud”); CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. MAIL 
AND WIRE FRAUD: A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW 2 (2019) 
[hereinafter DOYLE, MAIL AND WIRE FRAUD], https://fas.org/sgp/crs/ 
misc/R41930.pdf (“The mail and wire fraud statutes are essentially the same, ex-
cept for the medium associated with the offense—the mail in the case of mail 
fraud and wire communication in the case of wire fraud.”). 
 14 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (emphasis added). The statute further provides that  
if the violation occurs in relation to, or involving any benefit 
authorized, transported, transmitted, transferred, disbursed, or 
paid in connection with, a presidentially declared major disaster 
or emergency . . . or affects a financial institution, such person 
shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more 
than 30 years, or both. 
Id.; see also id. § 1341 (criminalizing use of the mails in “any scheme or artifice 
to defraud”); id. § 1344 (criminalizing “scheme or artifice to defraud” in bank 
fraud). 
 15 United States v. Maxwell, 579 F.3d 1282, 1299 (11th Cir. 2009); accord 
United States v. Sawyer, 85 F.3d 713, 723 (1st Cir. 1996) (“To prove mail or wire 
fraud, the government must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the defendant’s 
knowing and willing participation in a scheme or artifice to defraud with the spe-
cific intent to defraud, and (2) the use of the mails or interstate wire communica-
tions in furtherance of the scheme.”). 
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object of the scheme.”16 However numerous the formulation, harm 
is not among the elements. 
More than a century ago, the Supreme Court recognized that mail 
fraud is criminal even if the defendant’s letters are “absolutely inef-
fective.”17 Congress similarly intended wire fraud to be an inchoate 
offense, punishing schemes whether successful or unsuccessful.18 
 
 16 See, e.g., Fountain v. United States, 357 F.3d 250, 255 (2d Cir. 2004) (list-
ing elements as “(1) a scheme to defraud, (2) money or property as the object of 
the scheme, and (3) use of the mails or wires to further the scheme”) (quoting 
United States v. Dinome, 86 F.3d 277, 283 (2d Cir.1996) (alteration omitted)); 
United States v. McNeil, 320 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003) (listing elements as 
“a scheme to defraud, use of the wires in furtherance of the scheme, and the spe-
cific intent to defraud”); United States v. Merklinger, 16 F.3d 670, 678 (6th Cir. 
1994) (listing elements as “(1) the existence of a scheme to defraud, (2) use of 
wire communications in furtherance of the scheme, and (3) that the scheme was 
intended to deprive a victim of money and property”). Compare United States v. 
Williams, 527 F.3d 1235, 1240 (11th Cir. 2008) (“Under 18 U.S.C. § 1343, wire 
fraud requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the defendant participated 
in a scheme or artifice to defraud; (2) with the intent to defraud; and (3) used, or 
caused the use of, interstate wire transmissions for the purpose of executing the 
scheme or artifice to defraud.”), and United States v. Near, 708 F. App’x 590, 597 
(11th Cir. 2017) (“To convict the defendants of wire fraud in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1343, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that they 
(1) participated in a scheme or artifice to defraud; (2) with the intent to defraud; 
and (3) used, or caused the use of, interstate wire transmissions for the purpose of 
executing the scheme or artifice to defraud.”), with Williams, 527 F.3d at 1241 
(“Wire fraud requires proof of a scheme or artifice to defraud and the use of in-
terstate wire transmissions in furtherance of the scheme.”), and United States v. 
Aldissi, 758 F. App’x 694, 700 (11th Cir. 2018) (“To prove wire fraud under 18 
U.S.C. § 1343, the United States must establish that a defendant intentionally par-
ticipated in a scheme or artifice to defraud and used the interstate wires to carry 
out that scheme.”). 
 17 Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 315 (1896) (“It is enough if, having 
devised a scheme to defraud, the defendant, with a view of executing it deposits 
in the post office letters, which he thinks may assist in carrying it into effect, alt-
hough, in the judgment of the jury, they may be absolutely ineffective therefor.”). 
 18 United States v. Ross, 131 F.3d 970, 986 (11th Cir. 1997) (“Punishment 
under the wire fraud statute is not limited to successful schemes.”); United States 
v. D’Amato, 39 F.3d 1249, 1257 (2d Cir. 1994) (“The scheme to defraud need not 
have been successful or complete. . . . Therefore, the victims of the scheme need 
not have been injured.”); United States v. Dynalectric Co., 859 F.2d 1559, 1576 
(11th Cir. 1988) (“[C]onviction under the federal mail fraud statute only requires 
the government to prove a scheme to defraud; the success or failure of the scheme 
is irrelevant.”); United States v. Patterson, 528 F.2d 1037, 1041 (5th Cir. 1976) 
(“There is no necessity for the government to prove actual financial loss.”). 
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The victim need not suffer any financial loss at all.19  Since 2002, the 
statute has expressly criminalized “attempts” to commit the of-
fense.20 Even before that clarification, the Department of Justice 
treated attempted wire fraud as a crime: “this was not an impediment 
in practice, because proof of a scheme to defraud did not necessarily 
require proof that the scheme was successful.”21 On its face, the stat-
ute lacks any mention of harm or injury or loss or damage from the 
scheme or artifice, as well as any definition of “scheme or artifice.”22 
The crime lies simply in the scheme to defraud.23 
Unpacking that scheme is not so simple. Courts have filled the 
statutory vacuum by looking to and beyond the common law of 
fraud.24 Fraud is ancient, a bedrock of our jurisprudence with the ear-
liest recorded use of the noun dating to the fourteenth century.25  A 
writ of deceit, which “lay against one who had swindled another by 
the misuse of a legal procedure,” dates even further back, to 1201.26 
 
 19 See United States v. Artuso, 482 F. App’x 398, 402–03 (11th Cir. 2012) 
(“The mail and wire fraud statutes do not focus on the victim’s actual loss but on 
the defendant’s intent to obtain money or property by means of fraud or deceit. . . . 
The formulation and implementation of a scheme to defraud support a prosecuta-
ble offense regardless of its ultimate success or actual impact on the victim.”); 
Maxwell, 579 F.3d at 1302 (“[F]inancial loss is not at the core of these mail and 
wire frauds. Instead, the penal statutes also seek to punish the intent to obtain 
money or property from a victim by means of fraud and deceit.”). 
 20 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (2018) (“Any person who attempts or conspires to com-
mit any offense under this chapter shall be subject to the same penalties as those 
prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt 
or conspiracy.”). 
 21 Attach. to Attorney Gen. Memorandum on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
(Aug. 1, 2002), https://www.justice.gov/archives/ag/attachment-attorney-gen-
eral-august-1-2002-memorandum-sarbanes-oxley-act-2002. 
 22 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343; United States v. Bradley, 644 F.3d 1213, 
1239 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 23 See United States v. Takhalov, 827 F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 2016), mod-
ified, 838 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir. 2016)’ (“For § 1343 forbids only schemes to de-
fraud, not schemes to do other wicked things.”). 
 24 See, e.g., Bradley, 644 F.3d at 1239–40 (providing “a judicial framework 
for conceptualizing a fraudulent scheme” and noting that “[p]ursuant to the judicial 
definition, a ‘scheme to defraud’ is broader than the common law conception of 
fraud”); United States v. Pendergraft, 297 F.3d 1198, 1208 (11th Cir. 2002) 
(“[T]he meaning of ‘scheme to defraud’ has been judicially defined.”). 
 25 See Fraud, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 26 Iconco v. Jensen Constr. Co., 622 F.2d 1291, 1295 (8th Cir. 1980) (“The 
foundation case for the modern law of fraud was Pasley v. Freeman, 3 Term Rep. 
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Statutory prohibitions against fraud have a younger pedigree; Con-
gress first enacted a mail fraud statute in 1872 and codified wire 
fraud as a distinct crime in 1952.27 These statutes incorporate the 
common-law notion of fraud, but criminalize more conduct.28 Con-
gress abandoned traditional elements in favor of capturing society’s 
moral condemnation of dishonesty, deception, and unfair play.29 
Fraud has always reflected moral concerns, as it was historically 
defined as “any kind of artifice by which another is deceived.”30  The 
 
51, 100 Eng. Rep. 450 (K.B. 1789), after which it was recognized as a species of 
tort action.”). 
 27 See Act to Further the Communications Act of 1934, ch. 879, 66 Stat. 722 
§ 18(a) (1952) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1343); Donaldson v. Read 
Magazine, 333 U.S. 178, 189–90 (1948) (“In 1872 Congress first authorized the 
Postmaster General to forbid delivery of registered letters and payment of money 
orders to persons or companies found by the Postmaster General to be conducting 
an enterprise to obtain money by false pretenses through the use of the mails.”); 
Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 22 (1999); see also DOYLE, MAIL AND WIRE 
FRAUD, supra note 13, at 1–2 (“The first of the two, the mail fraud statute, 
emerged in the late 19th century as a means of preventing ‘city slickers’ from 
using the mail to cheat guileless ‘country folks.’”). 
 28 See Neder, 527 U.S. at 23, 25 (applying “the rule that Congress intends to 
incorporate the well-settled meaning of the common-law terms it uses” and noting 
that statutes “prohibit[] the ‘scheme to defraud,’ rather than the completed 
fraud”); Pendergraft, 297 F.3d at 1208 (“Courts have defined the phrase broadly, 
allowing it to encompass deceptive schemes that do not fit the common-law defi-
nition of fraud.”). 
 29 See Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182, 188 (1924) (noting 
that conspiracy to defraud the government “means primarily to cheat the govern-
ment out of property or money, but it also means to interfere with or obstruct one 
of its lawful governmental functions by deceit, craft or trickery, or at least by 
means that are dishonest”); Bradley, 644 F.3d at 1240 (noting that “scheme to 
defraud . . . defies measure by a technical standard,” but rather reflects “moral 
uprightness, . . . fundamental honesty, fair play and right dealing in the general 
and business life of members of society”) (quoting Gregory v. United States, 253 
F.2d 104, 109 (5th Cir. 1958)); United States v. Henningsen, 387 F.3d 585, 589 
(7th Cir. 2004) (in mail fraud context, finding scheme to defraud when conduct 
departs “from fundamental honesty, moral uprightness and candid dealings in the 
general life of the community”). 
 30 WILLARD, supra note 3, at 147; see also Fraud, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“A knowing misrepresentation or knowing conceal-
ment of a material fact made to induce another to act to his or her detriment.”). 
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harm lay in the cheating of the victim.31 Concentrating on the victim, 
a civil claim for fraud developed to require a showing of justifiable 
reliance and damage, among other elements.32 By contrast, the fed-
eral crimes of mail and wire fraud require neither reliance nor dam-
age.33 The fraud statutes cast a wider net, criminalizing “frauds that 
would not have been ‘actionable’ at common law.”34 But the net is 
not infinite. The government must, for example, prove materiality.35 
A scheme to defraud requires proof of either “a material misrepre-
sentation, or the omission or concealment of a material fact calcu-
lated to deceive another out of money or property.”36 Also, the stat-
utory notion of defrauding does not “include threat and coercion 
through fear or force.”37 Rather, defrauding “signifies ‘the depriva-
tion of something of value by trick, deceit, chicane, or overreach-
ing.’”38 
 
 31 WILLARD, supra note 3, at 147 (“Hence, all surprise, trick, cunning, dis-
sembling, and other unfair way that is used to cheat any one, is to be considered 
as fraud.”). 
 32 Neder, 527 U.S. at 22; see United States v. Feldman, 931 F.3d 1245, 1266 
(11th Cir. 2019) (listing elements of actionable fraud). 
 33 Neder, 527 U.S. at 24–25 (“By prohibiting the ‘scheme to defraud,’ rather 
than the completed fraud, the elements of reliance and damage would clearly be 
inconsistent with the statutes Congress enacted.”). 
 34 Feldman, 931 F.3d at 1266; see, e.g., Matthews v. Mass. Nat’l Bank, 16 F. 
Cas. 1113, 1116 (C.C.D. Mass. 1874) (“Damage without fraud, or fraud without 
damage, will not sustain an action.”); Stokes v. Victory Land Co., 128 So. 408, 
409 (Fla. 1930) (“Deceit and fraud, if not acted upon, or if not accompanied by 
injury, are moral, not legal, wrongs . . . . It is of the very essence of an action of 
fraud or deceit that the same shall be accompanied by damage.”). 
 35 See Neder, 527 U.S. at 20, 25 (“[M]ateriality of falsehood is an element of 
the federal mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud statutes”); United States v. 
Artuso, 482 F. App’x 398, 401 (11th Cir. 2012) (“To establish a scheme to defraud 
requires proof of a material misrepresentation or the omission or concealment of 
a material fact calculated to deceive another of money or property.”). 
 36 United States v. Maxwell, 579 F.3d 1282, 1299 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 37 Fasulo v. United States, 272 U.S. 620, 628 (1926); see Hammerschmidt v. 
United States, 265 U.S. 182, 188 (1924) (“[T]he words ‘to defraud’ as used in 
some statutes . . . usually signify the deprivation of something of value by trick, 
deceit, chicane, or overreaching. They do not extend to theft by violence. They 
refer rather to wronging one in his property rights by dishonest methods or 
schemes.”). 
 38 United States v. Pendergraft, 297 F.3d 1198, 1208–09 (11th Cir. 2002) 
(quoting Hammerschmidt, 265 U.S. at 188); see Hammerschmidt, 265 U.S. at 188 
(noting that defrauding statutes refer “to wronging one in his property rights by 
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A scheme to defraud, then, must be a scheme intended to deprive 
the victim of something of value, some tangible or intangible prop-
erty right.39 With a valuable thing at stake, the potential for harm 
looms.40 If the defendant’s scheme is successful and the deprivation 
occurs, then the victim is harmed. If the scheme is not successful and 
the deprivation does not occur, then the victim is not harmed. Re-
gardless, the scheme that envisions harm suffices for the crime.41 
A. United States v. Takhalov 
In 2016, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit de-
cided United States v. Takhalov and rested its analysis of § 1343 on 
the link between defrauding and value deprivation, echoing the com-
mon-law link between fraud and harm. With references to the Bible, 
Rick’s Café Américain in Casablanca, Mr. Spock in Star Trek, Mark 
Twain, Hunter S. Thompson, and both Oliver Wendell and Sherlock 
 
dishonest methods or schemes”); United States v. Barrington, 648 F.3d 1178, 
1191 (11th Cir. 2011) (noting that wire fraud and mail fraud statutes protect prop-
erty rights and, like those statutes, the computer fraud statute protects “things of 
value”). 
 39 Compare United States v. Carpenter, 484 U.S. 19, 25 (1987) (recognizing 
Wall Street Journal’s publication schedule and column contents as intangible 
property rights for purposes of mail and wire fraud), and Barrington, 648 F.3d at 
1191–92 (recognizing university’s “money or property” rights as “lost tuition re-
sulting from the unearned hours credited to the students, rather than the actual 
grades”), with Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 20 (2000) (holding that 
government’s regulatory interest in issuing a state or municipal license is not a 
property right under § 1341); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2018) (“For the purposes 
of this chapter, the term ‘scheme or artifice to defraud’ includes a scheme or arti-
fice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.”); Skilling v. 
United States, 561 U.S. 358, 408–09 (2010) (limiting “honest services” in § 1346 
to “only the bribe-and-kickback core of the pre-McNally case law”) (referencing 
McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987)). 
 40 See United States v. Siegel, 717 F.2d 9, 14 (2d Cir. 1983) (citation omitted) 
(“While the prosecution must show that some harm or injury was contemplated 
by the scheme, it need not show that direct, tangible economic loss resulted to the 
scheme’s intended victim.”). 
 41 See United States v. Williams, 527 F.3d 1235, 1245 (11th Cir. 2008) (not-
ing that government need not prove actual financial loss or benefit to defendant 
for wire fraud prosecution, but “merely needs to show that the accused intended 
to defraud his victim and that his or her communications were reasonably calcu-
lated to deceive persons of ordinary prudence and comprehension”) (quoting 
United States v. Ross, 131 F.3d 970, 986 (11th Cir. 1997)). 
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Holmes, the court tapped an impressive range of resources to address 
an otherwise dry issue of statutory interpretation.42 
The opinion opens with a Biblical bang, citing Exodus for the 
Ninth Commandment given to Moses on Mount Sinai: “Thou shalt 
not bear false witness against thy neighbor.”43  Such an act would be 
sinful, on high authority to be sure, but not necessarily criminal under 
§ 1343.44  Bearing false witness, like other wicked “schemes to lie, 
trick, or otherwise deceive,” may not involve any risk of harm.45    By 
contrast, wire fraud  requires at least the looming potential of harm 
because the criminal fraud statutes protect “things of value.”46 
The facts of Takhalov involved a “Bar Girls” or “B-girls” scheme 
that would likely violate several of the Ten Commandments, perhaps 
finding easy marks in Rick’s Café.47 The defendants hired attractive, 
Eastern European women to pose as tourists and entice male custom-
ers into the defendants’ nightclubs and bars in South Beach, where 
they would spend exorbitant sums on alcohol.48 The women tricked 
 
 42 See United States v. Takhalov, 827 F.3d 1307, 1310, 1311 n.2, 1313 n.6, 
1319 n.9 (11th Cir. 2016), modified, 838 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir. 2016). 
 43 Id. at 1310 n.1; Exodus 20:16. 
 44 Takhalov, 827 F.3d at 1310. 
 45 Id. (“The difference, of course, is that deceiving does not always involve 
harming another person; defrauding does.”). 
 46 United States v. Barrington, 648 F.3d 1178, 1191 (11th Cir. 2011); see Ta-
khalov, 827 F.3d at 1310; United States v. Bradley, 644 F.3d 1213, 1240 (11th 
Cir. 2011) (“To gauge a defendant’s intent to commit a fraudulent scheme, then, 
we must determine whether the defendant attempted to obtain, by deceptive means, 
something to which he was not entitled.”); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2018) (re-
quiring the defendant “having devised or intending to devise” a scheme or artifice). 
 47 The scheme would also violate Florida state law. Under the Florida Bever-
age Law statutes, it is a second-degree misdemeanor for any agent of an establish-
ment licensed to sell alcohol “to beg or solicit any patron or customer . . . to pur-
chase any beverage, alcoholic or otherwise,” for the agent. Fla. Stat. § 562.131 
(2019). That is just what happened, but the defendants in Takhalov faced more 
serious federal felony charges rather than state misdemeanor charges. 
 48 Takhalov, 827 F.3d at 1310; 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2018) (requiring “wire, ra-
dio, or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce”); see United 
States v. Feldman, 931 F.3d 1245, 1250 (11th Cir. 2019) (describing “Miami Beach 
nightclubs that hired foreign women to pose as tourists, attract patrons, and per-
suade them to buy drinks without paying attention to the clubs’ exorbitant prices”); 
Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Bar Club Operators Sentenced in South Beach “B-
Girls” Private Clubs Scheme (May 17, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/usao-
sdfl/pr/bar-club-operators-sentenced-south-beach-b-girls-private-clubs-scheme  
[hereinafter DOJ Press Release] (“The organization brought Eastern European 
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the men, targeted for their appearance as single, wealthy business-
men, by concealing that they worked for the clubs and bars and that 
they received a percentage of the money each customer spent in the 
establishment.49 Motivations were purely financial. If the men ran 
out of money, the B-girls would “abandon them in the street.”50 In 
one instance, two B-girls convinced a Philadelphia native, after sev-
eral drinks of hard liquor, wine, and Champagne, to accompany them 
to “a Russian-style nightclub” where he proceeded to spend more 
than $43,000 on Dom Pérignon Champagne, Beluga caviar, and a 
painting.51 The women were paid through illegal shell companies, 
which the defendants had created “to conceal profits and salary pay-
ments from their criminal enterprise.”52 According to one defend-
ant’s plea agreement, the B-girls received 20% of a scam worth be-
tween $400,000 and $1,000,000 in the end.53 
The lies supposedly continued after the men passed the velvet 
rope. Bar employees would hide menus, misrepresent drink prices, 
surreptitiously add vodka or drugs to the customers’ drinks, forge 
their signatures on credit card receipts, and serve the B-girls water in 
shot glasses.54  
The defendants denied everything other than the B-girls’ initial 
deception.55 If anything untoward or illicit happened inside the clubs, 
the defendants claimed ignorance and absence.56 In their view, 
 
women into the United States illegally to work as ‘Bar Girls’ or ‘B-Girls,’ to lure 
out-of town businessmen and tourists from legitimate South Beach clubs to the 
defendants’ private clubs.”). 
 49 Takhalov, 827 F.3d at 1311. 
 50 How Cruel Were the B-Girls?, CNBC (May 12, 2016, 11:16 AM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/video/2016/05/12/how-cruel-where-the-b-girls.html. 
(statement of retired Miami police detective Luis King). 
 51 Jay Weaver, ‘B-girl’ Trial a Cautionary Tale for Drunk SoBe Tourists, 
MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 3, 2012, https://www.miamiherald.com/latest-news/arti-
cle1944248.html [hereinafter Weaver, ‘B-girl’ Trial]. 
 52 DOJ Press Release, supra note 48. 
 53 Weaver, ‘B-girl’ Trial, supra note 51. 
 54 Takhalov, 827 F.3d at 1310; see United States v. Feldman, 931 F.3d 1245, 
1250–51 (11th Cir. 2019); DOJ Press Release, supra note 48. 
 55 Takhalov, 827 F.3d at 1310. 
 56 Id. at 1310–11 (“As for the swindling going on inside the clubs—the lying 
about prices, the forging of signatures, and so on—the defendants said that they 
knew nothing about it. Instead, the defendants testified, they were merely investors 
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significantly, the customers were not victims because the B-girls’ de-
ception delivered the customers just what they wanted: entrance into 
trendy South Beach clubs, bottles of liquor, and attractive female 
company for the evening.57 The customers might well have gone 
elsewhere had they known of the B-girls’ financial arrangement, but 
so be it.58 Were they not entertained?59 
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida con-
sidered a precise issue: whether the fact of the B-girls’ initial decep-
tion—standing alone, as conceded—would support a conviction for 
wire fraud.60 The government argued that it would, and the jury could 
convict based solely on that deception.61 The defense argued that it 
would not, and the jury could not convict based solely on the “failure 
to disclose the financial arrangement between the B-girls and the 
Bar.”62 Indeed, worried that they might be convicted of wire fraud 
based on nothing more than the B-girls’ concealment, the defendants 
requested a jury instruction that “[f]ailure to disclose the financial 
arrangement between the B-girls and the Bar, in and of itself, is not 
sufficient to convict a defendant of any offense.”63 The court denied 
the request as an incorrect statement of the law.64  Following the 
court’s lead, the government argued at closing that “the B-girls’ lies 
were material.”65 
The trial lasted three months, with the government charging nine-
teen defendants in a wide-ranging fraud conspiracy.66 Thirteen 
 
in the clubs—or in charge of the credit-card transactions—but were not involved 
in the day-to-day workings of the clubs.”). 
 57 Id. at 1311. 
 58 Id. (quoting prosecutor’s statement that “even the defendant’s own witness 
told you, had they known that these women worked for the clubs they likely 
wouldn’t have even gone”); see id. at 1310 (“That a defendant merely induced the 
victim to enter into a transaction that he otherwise would have avoided is therefore 
insufficient to show wire fraud.”) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 59 Cf. GLADIATOR (DreamWorks, Universal Pictures, Scott Free Productions 
2000) (Maximus Decimus Meridius asking crowd, “Are you not entertained?”). 
 60 Takhalov, 827 F.3d at 1311. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. at 1314. 
 64 Id. at 1311. 
 65 Id. 
 66 DOJ Press Release, supra note 48; Jay Weaver, Appeals Court Throws Out 
Miami Beach ‘Bar-Girl’ Convictions, MIAMI HERALD, July 11, 2016, 
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defendants pled guilty before trial, one pled guilty during trial, one 
was acquitted, and one was a fugitive.67 Three defendants were left 
to face the jury. Not surprisingly, as the defense had already con-
ceded the fact of the B-girls’ lies and the government stressed their 
materiality, the jury convicted the remaining defendants on multiple 
counts of wire fraud and money laundering.68 The named defendant, 
Albert Takhalov, received the longest sentence of twelve years in 
prison, as he had played a central role handling credit card transac-
tions at five nightclubs.69 
The defendants appealed to the Eleventh Circuit. At issue was 
whether the district court had abused its discretion in refusing to give 
the defendants’ proposed jury instruction.70 These “allegedly swin-
dled men . . . got what they paid for—nothing more, nothing less.”71 
So did the jury instruction state the law correctly?72 Is there no wire 
fraud when the victims received exactly what they asked for? Short 
answers: Yes, it did. And no, there is not.73 
 
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/miami-
beach/article88982837.html [hereinafter Weaver, Appeals Court]. 
 67 DOJ Press Release, supra note 48. 
 68 Takhalov, 827 F.3d at 1311. 
 69 See DOJ Press Release, supra note 48 (praising the combined “investigative 
efforts of the FBI, the Miami Beach Police Department, and ICE’s Homeland Se-
curity Investigations); Weaver, Appeals Court, supra note 66; Jay Weaver, Con-
victed Club Operator in Miami Beach “Bar Girl” Ring Sentences to 6 1/2 Years 
in Prison, MIAMI HERALD, June 1, 2016, https://www.miamiherald.com/latest-
news/article1952053.html. 
 70 Takhalov, 827 F.3d at 1310; see United States v. Carrasco, 381 F.3d 1237, 
1242 (11th Cir. 2004) (“We review a district court’s refusal to give a requested jury 
instruction for abuse of discretion. A district court’s refusal to give a requested 
instruction is reversible error if (1) the requested instruction was a correct state-
ment of the law, (2) its subject matter was not substantially covered by other in-
structions, and (3) its subject matter dealt with an issue in the trial court that was 
so important that failure to give it seriously impaired the defendant’s ability to de-
fend himself.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 71 Takhalov, 827 F.3d at 1311. 
 72 See United States v. Prather, 205 F.3d 1265, 1270 (11th Cir. 2000) (“We 
review the legal correctness of a jury instruction de novo, but defer on questions 
of phrasing absent an abuse of discretion.”) (citation omitted). 
 73 Takhalov, 827 F.3d at 1315–25 (finding that jury instruction was correct 
statement of law, critical to defendants’ case theory, and not substantially covered 
by other jury instructions, and that failure to give instruction was not harmless 
error); see id. at 1314 (stating that “a wire-fraud case must end in an acquittal if 
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Examining the statutory phrase, “scheme or artifice to defraud,” 
the Eleventh Circuit adopted the plain meaning of “defraud.”74  Per-
haps reflecting the advanced age of the noun “fraud,” dictionaries of 
legal terms and dictionaries of plain English converge on the verb 
form.75 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “defraud” as both “[t]o cause 
injury or loss to (a person or organization) by deceit” and “to trick (a 
person or organization) in order to get money.”76 Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary defines “defraud” more concisely (and somewhat circu-
larly) as “to deprive of something by deception or fraud.”77 Both 
Black’s and Merriam-Webster, then, add an injury or deprivation 
component to the notion of deception when defining “defraud.” 
Granted, a trick to get money may not in the end yield any money. 
But Black’s includes such definition only in parity with the causation 
of injury or loss.78 Defrauding includes a deception that is, critically, 
en route toward harm.79 Just as the ancient notion of fraud is tied to 
harm, and a common-law claim for fraud includes the element of 
damage, so the notion of defrauding is tied to intended harm.80 Ab-
sent an “intent to harm, there can only be a scheme to deceive, but 
 
the jury nevertheless believes that the alleged victims received exactly what they 
paid for”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 74 Id. at 1312. 
 75 See Defraud, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2020) (dating first known 
use of “defraud” modern meaning). 
 76 Defraud, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see Takhalov, 827 
F.3d at 1312 (quoting only the first definition). 
 77 Defraud, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2020), https://www.merriam-
webster.com; see Takhalov, 827 F.3d at 1312 (quoting 2002 edition of Webster’s 
Third New International Dictionary for definition of “defraud” as “to take or with-
hold from (one) some possession, right, or interest by calculated misstatement or 
perversion of truth, trickery, or other deception”). 
 78 See Become a True Dictionary Buff, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/words-at-play/dictionary-facts-and-trivia/ 
the-order-of-the-definitions-may-not-mean-what-you-think (last visited June 9, 
2020) (“All the senses of a word that are listed are equal.”). 
 79 Takhalov, 827 F.3d at 1312 (“Thus, deceiving is a necessary condition of 
defrauding but not a sufficient one.”). 
 80 Id. at 1313 (“[I]f a defendant does not intend to harm the victim . . . then 
he has not intended to defraud the victim.”); see, e.g., Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 
2d 625, 627 (Fla. 1985) (listing fraud elements as “(1) a false statement concern-
ing a material fact; (2) the representor’s knowledge that the representation is false; 
(3) an intention that the representation induce another to act on it; and, (4) conse-
quent injury by the party acting in reliance on the representation.”). 
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not one to defraud.”81 Deception may be always sinful, but is not 
always criminal.82 
The Eleventh Circuit next addressed what such intent to harm 
might look like, offering as illustration two versions of the following 
hypothetical.83 A man wants to exchange a dollar bill for four quar-
ters.84 So, using a cellphone signal that crosses state lines, he calls 
his neighbor and says that his child is terribly ill.85 When the neigh-
bor “runs over” out of concern, the man asks her to make change and 
“promises to give her a true dollar.”86 In truth, the child is not ill; the 
man just needed quarters and was not inclined to visit a bank.87 Ig-
noring questionable parenting choices, the court focused on the na-
ture of the bargain. In the first version of the hypothetical, the man 
and his neighbor exchange money and go about their days.88 In the 
second, the man passes a counterfeit bill to the neighbor.89 Even 
though both versions involve deception about the child, only the sec-
ond would be actionable as wire fraud.90 The second version involves 
defrauding due to the additional deception about the “true dollar.”91 
Only with the counterfeit bill did the man intend to deprive his neigh-
bor of something of value, and such deprivation of value ultimately 
inflicted harm.92 The man’s intent to harm his neighbor found 
 
 81 Takhalov, 827 F.3d at 1313; see id. at 1312 (noting that “to defraud, one 
must intend to use deception to cause some injury; but one can deceive without 
intending to harm at all”). 
 82 Id. at 1312 (“[O]ne who defrauds always deceives, but one can deceive 
without defrauding.”); see also United States v. Starr, 816 F.2d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 
1987) (“Although the government is not required to prove actual injury, it must, at 
a minimum, prove that defendants contemplated some actual harm or injury to their 
victims. Only a showing of intended harm will satisfy the element of fraudulent 
intent.”). 
 83 See Takhalov, 827 F.3d at 1313. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. at 1313 & n.4. 
 86 Id. at 1313. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id.; cf. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 353 n.3 (1996) (noting that “[d]epriv-
ing someone of an arguable (though not yet established) claim inflicts actual in-
jury because it deprives him of something of value”). 
1052 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:1037 
 
expression in his “lie about the nature of the bargain.”93 Signifi-
cantly, the neighbor’s money was the sole thing of value in this hy-
pothetical, as the law does not view neighborly trust and personal 
time as property rights under the protective umbrella of criminal 
fraud statutes.94 Trust and time fall into the unprotected category of 
“intangible, non-property, non-monetary rights.”95 
Analogously, on the facts of Takhalov, a beautiful young woman 
can target a businessman and lure him to drink at a bar while con-
cealing her relationship with the bar owner, all without committing 
wire fraud.96 Regardless of the bar owner’s “relationship with the 
woman, the businessman got exactly what he bargained for”: the 
target “received his drink, and he had the opportunity to buy a young 
woman a drink.”97 By contrast, if the woman promises the business-
man a glass of 1959 Dom Pérignon in exchange for his credit card 
payment, but intends to pour him a glass of Prosecco instead, then 
she does commit wire fraud “[b]ecause the misrepresentation goes 
to the value of the bargain.”98 As in the sick child hypothetical, shat-
tered trust and wasted time fall by the wayside. Only a lie about the 
financial exchange inside the bar expresses the defendant’s intent to 
deprive the victim of something of value and, so, to harm the 
 
 93 Takhalov, 827 F.3d at 1313–14. 
 94 See id. at 1313. (“Although the transaction would not have occurred but-
for the lie in the first scenario—the woman would have remained home except for 
the phony sickness—the man nevertheless did not intend to deprive the woman of 
something of value by trick, deceit, and so on.”) (alteration and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 95 See United States v. Dynalectric Co., 859 F.2d 1559, 1570 (11th Cir. 1988) 
(interpreting mail fraud statute and noting that “the only fraudulent schemes ex-
empt from the mail fraud statute are those involving intangible, non-property, 
non-monetary rights” and that the “statute applies to any fraudulent scheme in-
volving a monetary or property interest, whether that interest is tangible or intan-
gible”); see also Sekhar v. United States, 570 U.S. 729, 734 (2013) (holding that, 
for purposes of Hobbs Act, “[t]he property extorted must therefore be transfera-
ble—that is, capable of passing from one person to another”). 
 96 Takhalov, 827 F.3d at 1314. 
 97 Id. at 1313. 
 98 Id.  
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victim.99 Perhaps that bargain would not have occurred but for the 
opening lie, but the opening lie was not about the bargain.100 
Accordingly, for purposes of wire fraud, a scheme to defraud 
involves a “lie about the nature of the bargain.”101 Such lies primar-
ily reflect either price—a bottle of 1959 Dom Pérignon valued at 
$42,350—or quality—a bottle of sparkling wine corked in Italy ra-
ther than in France.102 A lie about anything other than the bargain 
itself, no matter how wicked, selfish, or unneighborly, cannot sup-
port a wire fraud prosecution.103 
At trial, the Takhalov defendants had asked the district court to 
instruct the jury that the B-girls’ lies outside the nightclubs were in-
sufficient to convict.104 The Eleventh Circuit interpreted that instruc-
tion as a statement “that the defendants had tricked the victims into 
entering a transaction but nevertheless gave the victims exactly what 
they asked for and charged them exactly what they agreed to pay.”105 
The B-girls’ lies were deceptive and intentional, but not lies about 
the bargain the purported victims were entering: an evening of “ab-
surdly expensive drinks at the bar.”106 That’s what the businessmen 
 
 99 See United States v. Starr, 816 F.2d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 1987) (“Misrepresen-
tations amounting only to a deceit are insufficient to maintain a mail or wire fraud 
prosecution. Instead, the deceit must be coupled with a contemplated harm to the 
victim. Moreover, the harm contemplated must affect the very nature of the bar-
gain itself.”); see also Takhalov, 827 F.3d at 1314 (adopting Second Circuit inter-
pretation of wire fraud statute). 
 100 Takhalov, 827 F.3d at 1310, 1313 (noting that “the woman would have 
remained home except for the phony sickness”). 
 101 Id. at 1313–14. 
 102 Id. at 1314, 1316; see Jenny Chang, Top Ten Most Expensive Champagne 
Bottles in the World in 2020, FINANCESONLINE (Jan. 14, 2020), https://finance-
sonline.com/top-10-most-expensive-champagne-bottles-in-the-world/; Roederer 
v. J. Garcia Carrión, S.A., 732 F. Supp. 2d 836, 841 (D. Minn. 2010) (“When used 
properly, the term ‘champagne’ denotes a sparkling wine made according to the 
traditional method from grapes grown in the Champagne region of France.”). 
 103 Takhalov, 827 F.3d at 1314 (“[I]f a defendant lies about something else . . . 
then he has not lied about the nature of the bargain, has not ‘schemed to defraud,’ 
and cannot be convicted of wire fraud on the basis of that lie alone.”). 
 104 Id. at 1310–11, 1315 (paraphrasing and quoting proposed jury instruction). 
 105 Id. at 1310. 
 106 Id. at 1316–18 (recognizing that defendants “did not argue that they lacked 
the specific intent to deceive the victims; indeed they admitted that they fervently 
hoped to do just that. The defendants instead argued that they had intended to 
deceive the victims in only one way—by tricking them into coming to the bars—
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got. According to the Eleventh Circuit, then, “the proposed instruc-
tion was a correct statement of the law.”107 The district court abused 
its discretion by refusing to give that jury instruction.108 Because the 
error was not harmless, the Eleventh Circuit reversed.109 
In its initial opinion in Takhalov, the Eleventh Circuit reversed 
all wire fraud convictions but one, based on an email one defendant 
had sent to American Express after it approved a questionable, alleg-
edly fraudulent charge on the customer’s credit card account.110 
Upon rehearing, the panel revised its opinion and reversed that last 
conviction as well, wiping clean the defendants’ wire fraud convic-
tions en masse.111 Deception yes, wire fraud no.112 
B. United States v. Feldman 
Three years after its rehearing in Takhalov, the Eleventh Circuit 
heard another appeal predicated on the B-girls’ lies. In United States 
v. Feldman, the court considered the same “basic hustle” underlying 
Takhalov, involving one of the same defendants from Takhalov.113 
Isaac Feldman, a real estate broker from Sunny Isles Beach who sup-
posedly “liked hanging out with the women because they made him 
feel like Hugh Hefner,” had invested in two Miami Beach nightclubs 
that hired B-girls.114 In the original trial, he received a sentence of 
eight years and four months in prison.115 After the court reversed the 
convictions of Feldman and his co-defendants, the government 
 
and that such a deception was not wire fraud. Put another way, the defendants did 
not dispute that they lacked specific-enough intent; they argued that what they 
specifically intended to do was not a crime.”). 
 107 Id. at 1316, 1319. 
 108 Id. at 1319–20. 
 109 Id. at 1323–24. 
 110 Id. at 1325; United States v. Takhalov, 838 F.3d 1168, 1170 (11th Cir. 
2016). 
 111 Takhalov, 838 F.3d at 1170. 
 112 See Raymond Lee, Note, American Greed: The Eleventh Circuit Analyzes 
Whether Booze, Babes, and Business Can Tightrope the Line Between Fraud and 
Deceit, 83 MO. L. REV. 753, 769 (2018) (“Somewhere between low moral stand-
ards and a penchant for profit lies a nexus in which objectionable business prac-
tices can thrive. The Defendants found precisely that sweet spot.”). 
 113 United States v. Feldman, 931 F.3d 1245, 1250 (11th Cir. 2019). 
 114 Id.; Weaver, ‘B-girl’ Trial, supra note 51; see Weaver, Appeals Court, su-
pra note 66. 
 115 DOJ Press Release, supra note 48. 
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redacted the indictment, Feldman again pleaded not guilty, and a new 
jury tried him individually.116 The jury convicted him of conspiracy 
to commit wire fraud and conspiracy to commit money laundering, 
and the trial judge sentenced him to the same 100-month prison 
term.117 He appealed, and a new Eleventh Circuit panel affirmed the 
convictions and sentence.118  Judge William Pryor wrote the panel 
opinion—and took the occasion to write a concurrence solely to “ex-
press some concerns about our puzzling opinion” in Takhalov.119 
The Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Takhalov was clear enough: 
the district court had committed reversible error when it rejected the 
defendants’ proposed jury instruction that the B-girls’ failure to dis-
close their financial arrangement with the bar, in and of itself, was 
not sufficient for a wire fraud conviction.120 Judge Pryor described 
that instruction as “obviously correct.”121 But the court’s holding was 
“all that is clear,” as “[t]he rationale for that decision remains an 
enigma.”122 Specifically, Judge Pryor took issue with the opinion’s 
“mixed signals” and unduly “narrow construction of the phrase 
‘scheme or artifice to defraud.’”123 Weighing in the balance various 
interpretations of the opinion, Judge Pryor found all wanting. 
First, on a narrow interpretation, the Takhalov court could have 
distinguished the B-girls’ mere nondisclosure from affirmative mis-
representation.124 Their failure to disclose would “never ‘in and of 
itself’” prove a scheme to defraud.125 Or, the court could have 
 
 116 Feldman, 931 F.3d at 1250, 1252. 
 117 Id. at 1250 (noting a sentence of 100 months). 
 118 Id. 
 119 See id. at 1254 (W. Pryor, J., concurring) (rejecting defendant’s arguments 
based on, among other things, double jeopardy, insufficient evidence, and due pro-
cess by way of Oliver Twist); id. at 1265–74. 
 120 Id. at 1265 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted); see id. at 1267 
(“To be sure, the bottom-line holdings of Takhalov are straightforward enough.”). 
 121 Id. at 1267; see id. at 1273 (“I do not mean to imply doubt about the cor-
rectness of its result.”). 
 122 Id. at 1273. 
 123 Id. at 1265, 1267 (“Although the holdings of Takhalov may be easy to un-
derstand, its reasoning is less so.”). 
 124 Id. at 1267. 
 125 Id. (adding that concealment “tantamount to a misrepresentation . . . must 
also be material, made with scienter, and intended to induce detrimental reli-
ance”). Judge Pryor noted that nondisclosure must be accompanied by “special 
circumstances” such as a confidential relationship between the parties. Id. 
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understood the jury “instruction to mean that the defendants would 
not have schemed to defraud if the only way they intended the con-
cealment of the B-girls’ employment status to affect customers was 
by influencing them merely to set foot in the nightclubs.”126 Tricking 
a customer into entering a nightclub would not constitute wire fraud 
because such a trick is not a transaction affecting the customer’s 
property rights.127 According to Judge Pryor, the problem with these 
narrow readings is that both would transform the thrust of the Takha-
lov court’s opinion into dicta: a “scheme to defraud” refers only to a 
scheme “in which a defendant lies about the nature of the bargain 
itself,” and thus a jury must acquit if “the alleged victims received 
exactly what they paid for.”128 The court would not need any of that 
discussion in order to reach the same outcome.129 
Moving on, Judge Pryor next offered a broad interpretation: there 
was no scheme to defraud even if the defendants intended the B-girls’ 
lies to “affect customers both by inducing them to set foot in the clubs 
and by inducing them to buy drinks once they were there.”130 The B-
girls lied standing outside the nightclubs and tricked their unsuspect-
ing targets into a bargain inside the nightclubs.131 From a harm per-
spective, the targets suffered no cognizable injury because they un-
derstood the essential terms of that bargain and got the drinks they 
paid for.132 Or, from a materiality perspective, the lies were immate-
rial because their subject matter was other than the “nature of the 
bargain.”133 
 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. at 1268. 
 128 United States v. Takhalov, 827 F.3d 1307, 1313–15 (11th Cir. 2016), mod-
ified, 838 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Feld-
man, 931 F.3d at 1273. 
 129 See Feldman, 931 F.3d at 1273. 
 130 Id. at 1268. 
 131 Id. at 1270 (describing “having been tricked into a transaction”). 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. (arguing that “[o]n the injury-based reading, the thesis of Part II.A.1 is 
that the harm of having been tricked into a transaction, while still understanding 
its essential terms, is not an injury that would make fraud actionable at common 
law” and “on the materiality-based reading, Part II.A.1 means that a lie about 
something other than ‘the nature of the bargain’ is necessarily immaterial”). 
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Judge Pryor rejected both perspectives as untethered from the 
common law.134 The problem with the “injury-based reading” is that 
common law has long recognized fraud in the inducement based on 
a collateral and material misrepresentation.135 To separate wire fraud 
from fraud in the inducement is to put the federal fraud statutes at 
odds with actionable fraud.136 The problem with the “materiality-
based reading” is that common law does not limit material statements 
to just those about price, quality, or nature of a bargain.137 Wire fraud 
requires a material falsehood, to be sure.138 But materiality is sensi-
tive to circumstances, reflects the perspective of a reasonable person, 
and defies limitation as a matter of law.139 A deception is material 
when “it has a natural tendency to influence, or is capable of influ-
encing, the decision maker to whom it is addressed.”140 
Perhaps bound by the norm of professional respect—and cer-
tainly by the norm of horizontal stare decisis141—Judge Pryor offered 
his concurrence not as a takedown of the court’s opinion but as a 
cautionary tale for judges and attorneys: “the bench and bar should 
 
 134 Id. at 1273 (“So, on examination, the two most plausible ways of translat-
ing the analysis of Part II.A.1 into the language of the common law turn out to be 
doctrinal dead ends.”). 
 135 Id. at 1270–71. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. at 1272–73. 
 138 Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 25 (1999). 
 139 Feldman, 931 F.3d at 1272; see Neder, 527 U.S. at 22 n.5; RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR ECON. HARM § 9 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft 
No. 2, 2014) (“Liability for fraud attaches only to misrepresentations that are ma-
terial. A misrepresentation is material if a reasonable person would give weight 
to it in deciding whether to enter into the relevant transaction, or if the defendant 
knew that the plaintiff would give it weight (whether reasonably or not). The ques-
tion, in effect, is whether the defendant knew or should have known that the mis-
representation would matter to the plaintiff.”). 
 140 United States v. Maxwell, 579 F.3d 1282, 1299 (11th Cir. 2009) (alteration 
and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 141 See, e.g., United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008) 
(“We acknowledge the strength of the prior panel precedent rule in this circuit. 
Under that rule, a prior panel’s holding is binding on all subsequent panels unless 
and until it is overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by the Supreme 
Court or by this court sitting en banc.”). 
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exercise due care in interpreting our opinion in Takhalov and deter-
mining its precedential value.”142 
Takhalov remains good law, but the Feldman concurrence may 
have blunted its force. Just six weeks after the Eleventh Circuit de-
cided Feldman, it decided United States v. Waters and yet again 
heard the appeal of a wire fraud conviction and considered the denial 
of a proposed jury instruction.143 There, the defendant had lied—
“lock, stock, and barrel; stem to stern, top to bottom”—when he sent 
fake letters to lenders attesting to his creditworthiness in order to ob-
tain a $6 million loan.144 Following Takhalov nearly word for word, 
the defendant had requested a jury instruction that “to defraud, one 
must intend to use deception to cause some injury; but one can de-
ceive without intending to harm at all” and “if a Defendant does not 
intend to harm the victim—to obtain, by deceptive means, something 
to which the Defendant is not entitled—then he has not intended to 
defraud the victim.”145 The district court refused to give that instruc-
tion, and the jury convicted the defendant on two counts of wire 
fraud.146 
Chief Judge Carnes had served on the unanimous panel that de-
cided Takhalov and now, writing for the unanimous panel in Waters, 
noted that a colleague on the bench “has questioned some of the 
statements in” Takhalov.147 Recognizing the Takhalov issues in the 
present case, the court nonetheless found its precedent distinguisha-
ble: “[w]e need not get into that here.”148 Reaching the opposite re-
sult from Takhalov, the court in Waters affirmed the district court’s 
refusal to give the proposed jury instruction as both incomplete and 
 
 142 Feldman, 931 F.3d at 1273 (“In the light of these concerns, I encourage the 
bench and bar to evaluate carefully the precedential value of Takhalov in future 
prosecutions under the fraud statutes.”). 
 143 United States v. Waters, 937 F.3d 1344, 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2019). 
 144 Id. at 1346. 
 145 Id. at 1349–50. 
 146 Id. at 1350. 
 147 Id. at 1351; see United States v. Takhalov, 827 F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 
2016), modified, 838 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir. 2016) (identifying panel of Chief Judge 
Carnes, Judge Martin, and U.S. District Judge Thapar sitting by designation from 
the Eastern District of Kentucky, with Judge Thapar as opinion author). 
 148 Waters, 937 F.3d at 1351. 
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misleading.149 In particular, the instruction would confuse the jury 
because it distinguished a scheme to defraud (where one necessarily 
intends harm) from a scheme to deceive (where one need not intend 
harm) without explaining that “harm” means depriving the victim of 
“what he paid for.”150 Although the proposed instruction correctly 
explained the holding of Takhalov, without the additional explana-
tion of harm, “the jury could hardly have been expected to apply our 
Takhalov decision correctly.”151 
These recent opinions appear to confine Takhalov to its sensa-
tional, tabloid-ready facts. But Takhalov is worth a closer look, as it 
offers an analytical tool for wire fraud prosecutions going forward. 
II. SPECIFIC HARM AND SPECIFIC INTENT 
The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Takhalov walks a fine line. The 
phrase “benefit of the bargain” never appears. Yet the court empha-
sized that the victims received “exactly what they wanted” and paid 
“exactly what they agreed to pay,” and at one point described a fic-
tional businessman who “got exactly what he bargained for.”152 
Those same facts would be relevant to determine compensation in 
civil fraud: under the benefit-of-the-bargain rule, a defrauded buyer 
may recover “as damages the difference between the value of the 
property as represented and the actual value received.”153 So Takha-
lov grafts a harm measure from a civil fraud case—benefit of the bar-
gain—onto a criminal wire fraud case that does not require actual 
harm. Adding to the puzzle, Judge Pryor is correct that any 
 
 149 Id. at 1353 (finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
refusing to give the proposed jury instruction even “[t]hough composed of quota-
tions from our opinion in Takhalov”). 
 150 Id. at 1353–54. 
 151 Id. at 1353. 
 152 Takhalov, 827 F.3d at 1310, 1314. 
 153 Benefit-of-the-Bargain Rule, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); 
see, e.g., Gregg v. U.S. Indus., Inc., 887 F.2d 1462, 1466 (11th Cir. 1989) (“Our 
review of the relevant case law indicates that Florida follows the ‘flexibility the-
ory’ in fraud actions, which permits a trial court to instruct the jury under either 
the out-of-pocket rule or the benefit of the bargain rule, whichever will more fully 
compensate the defrauded party.”). 
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interpretation of the wire fraud statute that untethers “scheme to de-
fraud” from common-law fraud is a nonstarter.154 
There may be a way to interpret Takhalov without losing its gist 
to dicta and without severing its ties to the common law. The central 
question—Is there no wire fraud when the victims received exactly 
what they asked for?—admits a longer answer. Specifically, there is 
no crime of wire fraud when the victims received the benefit of their 
bargain consistent with the defendant’s intent. This interpretation re-
spects both the court’s opinion and the type of intent required to es-
tablish federal criminal fraud. 
Consider again the Eleventh Circuit’s hypothetical of the caller, 
the neighbor, and the supposedly sick child.155 That story involves 
two lies: one about the welfare of the caller’s child, and one about 
the authenticity of the caller’s dollar bill. The first bargain is, “Please 
come over and check on my child, and you’ll receive my gratitude.” 
The second bargain is, “Please give me four quarters, and you’ll re-
ceive my dollar.” We must distinguish these bargains and examine 
each under the light of the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning. If only the 
first bargain includes deception, then there is no wire fraud because 
that bargain does not involve a thing of value in the eyes of the law: 
only trust and time. With no risk of harm, there is no intent to harm. 
By contrast, if the second bargain includes deception, then there is 
wire fraud because that bargain involves a thing of value: money. 
Now there is intent to harm. The two bargains may be sequential, 
with the first providing a necessary condition for the second. After 
all, the second bargain would not have occurred but for the first.156 
Nonetheless, they remain distinct for purposes of wire fraud 
 
 154 See United States v. Feldman, 931 F.3d 1245, 1265 (11th Cir. 2019) (W. 
Pryor, J., concurring) (“The Supreme Court has made clear that the statutory 
phrase ‘scheme or artifice to defraud’—a staple of the federal criminal-fraud stat-
utes . . .—incorporates the traditional common-law meaning of fraud.”); see also 
Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 22 (1999) (“[B]oth at the time of the mail 
fraud statute’s original enactment in 1872, and later when Congress enacted the 
wire fraud and bank fraud statutes, actionable ‘fraud’ had a well-settled meaning 
at common law.”). 
 155 Takhalov, 827 F.3d at 1313. 
 156 See id. (“And this is so even if the transaction would not have occurred but 
for the trick.”). 
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culpability, and only the lie that risks a cognizable harm can support 
a conviction.157 
Now consider a third version of the same hypothetical, which is 
a logical next step but left unstated in the court’s discussion. As in 
the second version, which supports wire fraud, the caller tells a lie 
about his sick child and a lie about his money. Again, there is some-
thing of value at stake, and the caller intends to harm his neighbor by 
passing a counterfeit bill. But assume that in the end he does not do 
so. Perhaps he mistakenly picked up a true dollar, or his healthy child 
ran into the room and thwarted the money exchange. Whatever 
caused the defendant’s scheme to fail, that failure should be irrele-
vant for purposes of prosecution. Wire fraud punishes both success-
ful and unsuccessful schemes.158 In this third version, the neighbor 
seems to have received the benefit of her bargain: she never took a 
counterfeit bill. Following the “exactly what they asked for” lan-
guage from Takhalov, is there no offense here? Does incompletion 
negate wire fraud? 
That cannot be right, and it is best to avoid any interpretation that 
crashes into a reductio ad absurdum. Of course, the government may 
not bother prosecuting a clumsy, failed scheme to defraud.159 Sen-
tencing guidelines recommend less prison time in the absence of loss 
to a victim, which may further diminish the government’s motivation 
to prosecute.160 Nonetheless, that de facto outcome does not alter the 
conceptual point: an analysis of wire fraud must reach both success-
ful and unsuccessful schemes.161 We cannot read into the crime of 
 
 157 See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 25 (1987) (recognizing The 
Wall Street Journal’s publication schedule and column contents as intangible 
property rights for purposes of mail and wire fraud). 
 158 See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 131 F.3d 970, 986 (11th Cir. 1997). 
 159 See United States v. Binday, 804 F.3d 558, 570 & n.10 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(shifting from “requirement of contemplated harm” for wire fraud to “requisite 
harm,” and rejecting “application of the mail and wire fraud statutes where the 
purported victim received the full economic benefit of its bargain,” while uphold-
ing “convictions for mail and wire fraud where the deceit affected the victim’s 
economic calculus or the benefits and burdens of the agreement”) (emphasis 
added). 
 160 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2018) (describing base offense level for fraud conviction). 
 161 See United States v. Williams, 728 F.2d 1402, 1405 (11th Cir. 1984) (stat-
ing that the government “is not required to prove that the scheme succeeded to 
sustain a conviction under the mail fraud statute,” and rejecting jury instruction 
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wire fraud an element that is notably absent; Congress sought to pun-
ish unsuccessful schemes by excluding the element of harm.162 But 
it did include the element of intent: the defendant “must intend to use 
deception to cause some injury.”163 A stronger interpretation of Ta-
khalov looks not just at whether the victims received exactly what 
they asked for, but whether that receipt was consistent with the de-
fendant’s intent. The Eleventh Circuit crystallizes the type of harm 
that must be looming in any wire fraud case: the bargain concerns 
something of value, and the potential victim would lose the benefit 
of that bargain. The opinion then suggests a deeper look: if the vic-
tim’s benefit of the bargain matches the defendant’s intent, then wire 
fraud does not lie. 
Indeed, the court tracks backward from the outcome of the B-
girls’ lies—the targets received exactly what they asked for—to the 
defendants’ intent: “had the requested instruction been given, a ra-
tional jury could find that the defendants lacked the intent to defraud 
on almost all of the wire-fraud counts.”164 This consistency analysis 
 
“on the benefit or lack of benefit Williams received from the theft [as] . . . con-
fusing and misleading”); see also United States v. George, 477 F.2d 508, 512 (7th 
Cir. 1973) (“Since the gravamen of the [mail fraud] offense is a ‘scheme to de-
fraud,’ it is unnecessary that the Government allege or prove that the victim of the 
scheme was actually defrauded or suffered a loss.”). 
 162 But see Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 23 (1999) (Supreme Court 
reading materiality requirement into fraud statutes and noting that “we cannot in-
fer from the absence of an express reference to materiality that Congress intended 
to drop that element from the fraud statutes”). 
 163 United States v. Takhalov, 827 F.3d 1307, 1312–13 (11th Cir. 2016), mod-
ified, 838 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir. 2016); see United States v. Waters, 937 F.3d 1344, 
1353 (11th Cir. 2019) (noting that proposed jury instruction “emphasized the re-
quirement that a defendant have the intent to harm”); United States v. Starr, 816 
F.2d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 1987) (“Although the government is not required to prove 
actual injury, it must, at a minimum, prove that defendants contemplated some 
actual harm or injury to their victims. Only a showing of intended harm will sat-
isfy the element of fraudulent intent.”); United States v. Masino, No. 3:16cr17-
MCR, 2019 WL 1045179, at *1 n.2 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 5, 2019) (finding “no evi-
dence of an intent to harm the charities by depriving them of property or money, 
as necessary to sustain the wire fraud conspiracy charge”); see also Lanuti, supra 
note 10, at 1155 (“There is a split in the circuits on whether an ‘intent to defraud’ 
requires proof of an intent to harm or injure in cases in which the object of the 
fraud is money or property.”). 
 164 Takhalov, 827 F.3d at 1322; see id. at 1310–11 (describing jury instruction 
interchangeably as “they must acquit if they found that the defendants had tricked 
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finds support in the court’s repeated references throughout Takhalov 
to both giving “the victims exactly what they asked for” and “not 
intending to harm the victim.”165 In the above hypothetical, then, the 
caller would still be guilty of wire fraud because his neighbor did not 
receive the benefit of her bargain consistent with his intent. Rather, 
the caller intended to harm his neighbor by depriving her of the ben-
efit of her bargain for the dollar exchange. 
Given the sordid facts of the B-girls’ hustle and the nearly twenty 
indicted defendants, it is easy to entangle the admitted lies outside 
the nightclubs with the alleged lies inside the nightclubs.166 But the 
issue before the Eleventh Circuit in Takhalov was focused to a pin-
point and forces us to isolate illicit activity. We must assume that the 
only lies in the case came from the B-girls standing outside the night-
clubs and luring businessmen into the nightclubs: “Please join me in 
this bar, and you’ll receive my company and buy me drinks.” 
Those lies are precisely and narrowly the focus of the defendants’ 
proposed jury instruction: “[f]ailure to disclose the financial arrange-
ment between the B-girls and the Bar, in and of itself, is not suffi-
cient to convict a defendant of any offense.”167 And both sides 
agreed that the B-girls’ lies could be viewed in isolation. The defend-
ants conceded this sole, initial deception, testifying “that they be-
lieved this scheme was a perfectly legitimate business model.”168 
 
the victims into entering a transaction but nevertheless gave the victims exactly 
what they asked for and charged them exactly what they agreed to pay” and 
“[f]ailure to disclose the financial arrangement between the B-girls and the Bar, 
in and of itself, is not sufficient to convict a defendant of any offense”). 
 165 See, e.g., id. at 1313 (noting that “one can deceive without intending to 
harm at all”); id. at 1313–14 (finding no intent to defraud where defendant “does 
not intend to harm the victim” and asking, “Did the man get what he bargained 
for? Yes.”); id. at 1314 (“exactly what they paid for”); id. at 1316 (“exactly what 
they ordered”); id. at 1319 (“exactly what he paid for”); accord United States v. 
Regent Office Supply Co., 421 F.2d 1174, 1182 (2d Cir. 1970) (“[W]e conclude 
that the defendants intended to deceive their customers but they did not intend to 
defraud them, because the falsity of their representations was not shown to be 
capable of affecting the customer’s understanding of the bargain nor of influenc-
ing his assessment of the value of the bargain to him, and thus no injury was 
shown to flow from the deception.”). 
 166 See supra at Section I.A. 
 167 Takhalov, 827 F.3d at 1311, 1314 (emphasis added). 
 168 Id. at 1311; see also United States v. Waters, 937 F.3d 1344, 1355 (11th 
Cir. 2019) (noting that the Takhalov “defendants argued that their concealment of 
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While the government alleged many more misdeeds, it was content 
to have the jury convict on that one deception, arguing at closing that 
“the first lie was by the girls to get them to come to the clubs by not 
telling them that they work for the clubs and got a percentage and 
this was material.”169 Accordingly, to faithfully interpret Takhalov, 
we must assume that the defendants were not responsible for lies 
about anything else—no hiding menus, no misrepresenting drink 
prices, no adding vodka or drugs to customers’ drinks, no forging 
credit card signatures, and no pouring water in shot glasses.170 Erase 
all those details. We are left with beautiful women misrepresenting 
themselves as financially disinterested tourists to entice wealthy 
businessmen to spend the evening in a bar.171 Nothing more. In es-
sence, the B-girls told a lie analogous to the sick child, but not a lie 
analogous to the counterfeit dollar.172 
Thus, the B-girls’ initial deception cannot support wire fraud be-
cause the victims received what they asked for and a rational jury 
could find the defendants’ intent consistent with that outcome. A cor-
ollary from Takhalov is that when the defendants’ intent is incon-
sistent with the victims’ receipt of what they asked for, wire fraud 
still lies.173 Wire fraud requires the specific intent to defraud, 
 
their relationship with the B-Girls did not constitute wire fraud, regardless of 
whether that concealment was material to the businessmen’s decisions to enter the 
clubs”). 
 169 Takhalov, 827 F.3d at 1311, 1319 (noting that government “repeatedly ar-
gued below that the B-Girls’ lies about their employment status was enough to 
convict the defendants of wire fraud”); see id. at 1316 n.8 (“The government of 
course argued that, in addition to tricking the victims into entering the bar, the 
defendants also charged them exorbitant drink-prices that the menus nowhere ad-
vertised. But all that shows is that the defendants’ case theory required the jury to 
find that the defendants did not monkey with the prices.”). 
 170 Id. at 1310–11 (noting that defendants did not view the “allegedly swindled 
men” as “truly victims”). 
 171 See United States v. Feldman, 931 F.3d 1245, 1260 (11th Cir. 2019) (iden-
tifying “the fraud theory that we rejected in Takhalov” as simply “that the B-girls’ 
concealment of their relationship with the clubs was an act of fraud”). 
 172 See Takhalov, 827 F.3d at 1310–11, 1313. 
 173 See United States v. Near, 708 F. App’x 590, 593, 602 (11th Cir. 2017) 
(affirming wire fraud convictions involving Small Business Innovation Research 
Program even though “district court determined that there was no loss to the gov-
ernment in this case because NSF and NASA got what they bargained for”); 
United States v. Starr, 816 F.2d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting that “the deceit must 
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defrauding requires the intent to harm, and harm occurs when the 
victim does not receive what he requests.174 It makes sense, then, that 
the Eleventh Circuit connects the outcome—“the alleged victims re-
ceived exactly what they paid for”—with the deception—“a defend-
ant lies about the nature of the bargain itself.”175 The deception—
about the bargain—must reflect the harm—about the benefit of that 
bargain.176 The Eleventh Circuit offers price and characteristics of a 
good as “primary forms” of such a deception, not an exhaustive 
list.177 A lie about the nature of the bargain just is an expression of 
intent to deprive a victim of the benefit of his bargain, through price, 
characteristics, or otherwise.178 What counts as a lie about the nature 
 
be coupled with a contemplated harm to the victim [and] the harm contemplated 
must affect the very nature of the bargain itself”) (emphasis added). 
 174 See United States v. Maxwell, 579 F.3d 1282, 1302 (11th Cir. 2009) (not-
ing that “the specific intent required under the mail and wire fraud statutes is the 
intent to defraud, not the intent to violate a particular statute or regulation”). 
 175 Takhalov, 827 F.3d at 1314–15; see id. at 1316 (describing defense theory 
as “we gave the victims exactly what they ordered . . . and thus any lies about the 
B-girls’ employment status did not misrepresent the value of the bargain”). 
 176 See id. at 1317 (finding district court’s good-faith jury instruction insuffi-
cient because it “concerned only what it meant for the defendants to have a spe-
cific intent to deceive” but “said nothing about what kind of deception could con-
stitute wire fraud”); see also United States v. Fullwood, No. 3:16-cr-48-J-34JBT, 
2016 WL 5106940, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2016) (denying motion to dismiss 
because, after identifying bargain as “the donated money would be used for a par-
ticular purpose,” the court could not “say as a matter of law that a misrepresenta-
tion regarding how donated funds are to be used does not concern the ‘nature of 
the bargain’ within the meaning of the wire fraud statute”). 
 177 Takhalov, 827 F.3d at 1313; see Primary, MERRIAM-WEBSTER 
DICTIONARY (2020), (offering definitions of “first in order or time or develop-
ment,” “of first rank, importance, or value,” and “direct, firsthand”); cf. Robinson 
v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 595 F.3d 1269, 1273 (11th Cir. 2010) (describing “two pri-
mary factors” for judicial estoppel and noting that “these factors are not exhaus-
tive” and “courts must always give due consideration to the circumstances of the 
particular case”). But see United States v. Waters, 937 F.3d 1344, 1354 (11th Cir. 
2019) (describing misrepresentation about nature of bargain as either “about the 
value of the thing” or “about the thing itself”); Takhalov, 827 F.3d at 1315–16 
(approving jury instruction limited to “lie about the quality or price”). 
 178 See United States v. Johnson, 945 F.3d 606, 612 (2d Cir. 2019) (“In right-
to-control cases we determine if sufficient proof of fraudulent intent exists by 
considering whether the defendant’s deception affected the very nature of the bar-
gain between the defendant and the victim.”) (alteration and internal quotation 
marks omitted) (emphasis added); United States v. Regent Office Supply Co., 421 
F.2d 1174, 1182 (2d Cir. 1970) (“[W]e have found no case in which an intent to 
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of the bargain, and what counts as a lie about something else, will 
depend on the facts of the bargain at issue.179 
Looking back at the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Waters, the 
court found the defendant’s proposed jury instruction incomplete 
partly because, although it “emphasized the requirement that a de-
fendant have the intent to harm, . . . it never defined what harm 
meant.”180 Takhalov instructs that harm means “the victim didn’t get 
what he paid for.”181 A wire fraud defendant must intend that harm. 
In the end, Takhalov stands as a modest clarification to the law 
of wire fraud, assigning an initial analytical role to harm. We should 
look for a specific type of harm, namely, whether the victim received 
the benefit of his bargain, and then ask whether that outcome is con-
sistent with the defendant’s intent. The ancient link between fraud 
and harm endures, even while harm remains outside the elements of 
a federal criminal fraud offense. 
 
deceive has been equated with an ‘intent to defraud’ where the deceit did not go 
to the nature of the bargain itself.”); see also Takhalov, 827 F.3d at 1314 (compli-
menting Second Circuit’s interpretation as “follow[ing] as a matter of logic from 
Congress’s decision to use the phrase ‘scheme to defraud’ rather than ‘scheme’ or 
‘scheme to deceive’”); United States v. Shellef, 507 F.3d 82, 108 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(finding “a fine line between schemes that do no more than cause their victims to 
enter into transactions they would otherwise avoid—which do not violate the mail 
or wire fraud statutes—and schemes that depend for their completion on a mis-
representation of an essential element of the bargain—which do violate the mail 
and wire fraud statutes”). 
 179 See Takhalov, 827 F.3d at 1314 (noting that “if a defendant lies about 
something else—e.g., if he says that he is the long-lost cousin of a prospective 
buyer—then he has not lied about the nature of the bargain”); Fullwood, 2016 WL 
5106940, at *7 (describing “a contributor’s expectation about how his donation 
will be used” as “go[ing] to the essence of the bargain itself”). A fact-specific 
analysis may help assuage Judge Pryor’s concern in Feldman that the court’s ex-
clusion of “lies about something else” from wire fraud cases effectively excludes 
all fraud-in-the-inducement cases. See United States v. Feldman, 931 F.3d 1245, 
1271–72 (11th Cir. 2019); see also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 2, 8–9, Al-
dissi v. United States, No. 19-5805 (S. Ct. Aug. 29, 2019) (claiming in wire fraud 
case that “the evidence and the verdict can be understood only in the context of a 
fraudulent inducement theory”). 
 180 Waters, 937 F.3d at 1353. 
 181 Id. at 1354. 
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III. BENEFIT OF WHICH BARGAIN? 
With harm front and center after Takhalov, future wire fraud 
cases may focus as a starting point on the potential harm from the 
alleged scheme: which bargain carries something of value for a fraud 
scheme and, thus, counts under the benefit-of-the-bargain analysis? 
Two recent federal cases involving the “right to control” theory of 
wire fraud support this prediction. 
In the Eleventh Circuit case of Aldissi v. United States, two sci-
entists were charged with wire fraud for submitting fraudulent re-
search proposals to acquire federal funding, totaling approximately 
$10.5 million in competitive contracts and grants designed to assist 
small businesses in research and innovation.182 The government al-
leged that the defendants had lied about their laboratory space, equip-
ment, physical address, subcontractors, employees, and eligibility, 
used Photoshop and copy-and-paste commands to forge letters of 
support, and falsified business records.183 After an eighteen-day trial, 
a jury convicted both defendants, sentenced one to 180 months’ im-
prisonment and the other to 156 months, and ordered them to pay 
back millions in restitution.184 On appeal, the defendants admitted 
that they had lied and forged documents and were not eligible for the 
funding, but claimed that there was insufficient evidence for wire 
fraud convictions.185 
Following its opinion in Takhalov, the Eleventh Circuit identified 
the “fundamental dispute” to be “whether the Scientists’ admittedly 
material lies changed the nature of the bargain with the governmental 
agencies from whom they sought grants.”186 Absent the scientists’ 
lies, the agencies would not have funded their research proposals.187 
Yet, despite their deception, the defendants argued that there was no 
scheme to defraud because they always intended to perform the re-
search projects, they did fully perform, and “the government re-
ceived exactly what it paid for: license-free access to technical 
data.”188 The court rejected this argument as without merit, finding 
 
 182 Aldissi v. United States, 758 F. App’x 694, 698–99 (11th Cir. 2018). 
 183 Id. 
 184 Id. at 698; see Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 179, at 4, 10. 
 185 Aldissi, 758 F. App’x at 699, 701. 
 186 Id. at 701. 
 187 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 179, at 7. 
 188 Aldissi, 758 F. App’x at 701. 
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that the defendants’ deception did go to the nature of the bargain: 
“[b]y submitting applications which were replete with falsities, the 
Scientists defeated the entire purpose of the programs.”189  The de-
fendants also argued that the trial court had erred in instructing the 
jury that it could find “specific intent to harm if the Scientists acted 
for personal gain or to harm the United States.”190 Again the Elev-
enth Circuit disagreed “because ‘financial loss is not at the core of’ 
mail and wire fraud.”191 
After losing on appeal, the scientists turned to the Supreme Court 
with a petition for writ of certiorari, asking the high court to resolve 
a circuit split regarding what counts as cognizable harm for purposes 
of wire fraud.192 Specifically, the circuits are split seven to four on 
“whether the deprivation of a victim’s ‘right to control’ how to spend 
its money or to make informed economic decisions” is alone a suffi-
cient property interest under the protection of the criminal fraud stat-
utes.193 The defendants argued against their wire fraud convictions 
because “the agencies received the financial benefit of their bargains 
(i.e., scientific research in exchange for money) while losing nothing 
more than their ‘right to control’ which scientists to fund.”194 In their 
view, an exchange of research for money is a bargain that wire fraud 
protects, while an exchange of research for the “right to control” is 
not.195 Tracking backward, the agencies received the benefit of the 
bargain that counts, consistent with the defendants’ intent.196 
 
 189 Id. at 702. The Aldissi court noted that “[b]ecause the Scientists’ lies, for-
geries, and fabricated price quotes related to key ingredients for commercializa-
tion, those deceptions ‘dishonestly circumvented the worthy purpose of the pro-
grams.’” Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting United States v. Maxwell, 579 F.3d 
1282, 1303 (11th Cir. 2009)). 
 190 Id. at 703. 
 191 Id. (quoting Maxwell, 579 F.3d at 1302). 
 192 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 179, at 14–19. 
 193 Id. at 14; see id. at 33 (asking Supreme Court to decide “right to control” 
theory “once and for all”). 
 194 Id. at 27. 
 195 Id. 
 196 Id. at 28 (arguing that because “agencies received the full financial benefit 
of their bargains; that is, they lost nothing more than their ‘right to control’ . . . 
the Government failed to prove specific intent to harm or harm itself”); see id. at 
29 (stating “they had no specific intent to financially harm and visited no financial 
harm upon the United States”). 
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Similarly, in the Second Circuit case of United States v. Johnson, 
the defendant was convicted of wire fraud and conspiracy to commit 
wire fraud based on his misrepresentations in a foreign currency ex-
change.197 At trial and on appeal, the defendant argued that the so-
phisticated party on the other side of the exchange had received the 
benefit of its bargain.198 The jury convicted, and the Second Circuit 
affirmed based on the “right to control” theory of harm.199 The court 
looked directly from the harm to the deception as an expression of 
intent: “[i]n right-to-control cases we determine if sufficient proof of 
fraudulent intent exists by considering whether the defendant’s de-
ception affected the very nature of the bargain between the defendant 
and the victim.”200 
The defendant in Johnson filed an emergency motion to stay the 
appellate court’s order pending the filing and disposition of his peti-
tion for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court.201 Like the petitioners 
in Aldissi, his forthcoming certiorari petition will ask the Court to 
determine whether the loss of one’s “right to control” property is a 
type of bargain that supports wire fraud.202  
In February 2020, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Aldissi 
and the Second Circuit granted the stay in Johnson.203  
CONCLUSION 
The question raised in Aldissi and Johnson is essential after Ta-
khalov. Federal sentencing for wire fraud varies based on harm. The 
analysis may, as well. As harm continues to play a key role in federal 
criminal fraud, reflecting its starring role in common-law fraud, 
courts will have to clarify what aspects of a bargain are valuable and, 
thus, worthy of protection. Otherwise, we will not know whether the 
victim received the benefit of one. 
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